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This text is about detachment. A comparative analysis 
is carried out between the detachment performed 
(in theatre) by Bertolt Brecht and stage designer 
Caspar Neher and the type of detachment found (in 
architecture) by Manfredo Tafuri in buildings since 
the Renaissance.
In both cases, detachment is identified where 
there is a dissonance between an object and its 
context. Both Marxists and ideologically affiliated to 
“historical materialism”, Brecht and Tafuri advocate 
the practice of relativization of history through 
the confrontation of different historical periods 
(a particular way of decontextualization). Both of 
them believe also in the libertarian and politically 
destabilizing potential of detachment. However, 
the similarities end here. From this point onwards, 
the discussion evolves to identify the implications 
of the centrality Tafuri awards to the language of 
buildings, which constitutes a departure from the 
production issue at the basis of Brecht’s materialistic 
“aesthetics”. Finally, this difference leads to yet 
another divergence, related to the type of spatial 
device each of them works with: the difference 
between a stage and the opposite of a stage.
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Renaissance 3D
I shall begin by talking about the Renaissance 
period, six centuries ago. A time when there was 
no photography or printing press. A time when 
Architecture, often associated to Sculpture or 
Painting, was one of the few ways of producing and 
spreading images. The time when a scientific system 
for depicting reality, called “perspective”, was 
invented. After that, space could be represented, not 
just with depth of field, but also with a continuous, 
progressive and commensurable evolution between 
the near and the distant.
Perspective made it possible to create images 
– two-dimensional representations – similar in 
appearance to what the human eye sees when 
observing things around it; or, at least, considerably 
more so than previously existing images. 
Filippo Brunelleschi sought to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of perspective as a representation 
system by making this similarity obvious, and for 
this he used his famous tavoletta. In order to use 
the tavoletta, the observer would stand in front of 
the Battisterio de San Giovanni, holding a painting 
of that building from the back, the depiction of the 
building facing the building itself. The real baptistery 
could be seen through a hole in the centre of the 
painting. In addition to the painting, the observer 
would also hold a mirror. When placed in front of 
the hole, the mirror would partially block the view 
of part of the building, but this could still be seen. 
The hidden part was replaced by the reflection of 
the painting. There would be seamless continuity 
between the baptistery parts that were not blocked 
by the mirror and the part that was blocked but 
replaced by the reflection of its depiction in the 
painting. From the standpoint of the human eye, the 
two-dimensional representation had an appearance 
similar to the three-dimensional object it depicted 
(Panofsky, 1992).
In addition to this empirical demonstration, 
Brunelleschi also substantiated the legitimacy of 
perspective scientifically, through the graphical 
construction which made the image possible, but I 
would like to focus on the appearance of perspective 
– its verisimilitude. The possibility of an image being 
convincing enough for the human eye not only 
marked the onset of a new era of representational 
epistemology (the representation of space and 
representation in general), but it was also the first 
time there was scope for representations that could 
deceive – which the French would later designate 
quite literally as “deceive the eye” (trompe-l’oeil).
The representation of spaces that did not exist 
was not a novelty. The novelty resided in the 
illusionism: the relatively convincing impression of 
standing before a space that was actually nothing 
more than its representation. This illusionism was 
all the more eloquent the more the fictitious thing 
was conceived to be mistaken for real, i.e., the 
more the perspectival representation of space co-
existed in apparent seamlessness with real spaces, 
or with people and objects. And so was born the 
modern concept of “stage design”: spaces which 
were only perspectically represented on a surface 
(the traditional backdrops) and spaces which did 
exist but, due to the accelerated perspective, 
appeared to be something they were not, such as 
the superlative Teatro Olimpico (1575-1585) by the 
architect Andrea Palladio.
dissonance
I will not dwell on the history of stage design 
anymore. I would like to introduce a different 
subject and get back to stage design later. I will 
resume the topic of the Renaissance period but, 
this time, to consider some of Manfredo Tafuri’s 
thoughts on this matter.
Referring to the Renaissance, Tafuri (1988: 36-38) 
stated: 
From the moment that Brunelleschi 
institutionalizes a linguistic code and a symbolic 
system based on the supra-historical confrontation 
with the great example of Antiquity, at a time 
when Alberti is no longer satisfied by a mythical 
historicism and rationally explores the structure 
of that code in its syntactic as well as emblematic 
values, in that time span begins the first major 
attempt in modern history to refresh historical 
values as the translation of a mythical term to the 
present day, from archaic meanings to revolutionary 
messages, from old “words” to civil actions.
(...)
Brunelleschi’s architectural objects, 
autonomous and absolute, were intended to 
intervene in the structures of the medieval city by 
subverting and changing their meanings. (…) One 
of the greatest lessons of Brunelleschi’s Humanism 
resides in his view of the pre-existing city as an 
ephemeral and available structure, ready to change 
its global significance once the Romanesque-Gothic 
balance of “continuous narration” is changed with 
the introduction of compact architectural objects.
(...)
Therefore, Brunelleschi performs his urban 
revolution using architectural objects as a starting 
point. He seems aware that the level of rigour 
employed in their construction alone implies the 
introduction of a new code for interpretation, even 
for the city as a structure. What was previously 
the norm – the historical overlay of events and 
the paratactic nature1 of space – now becomes 
the exception, when interpreted in the light of 
the new humanist linguistic code. Conversely, the 
rational rigour of the organism, which used to be 
the exception, becomes the norm.
According to Tafuri, Brunelleschi’s buildings 
inaugurated a new architecture. They did not obey 
or provide continuity to an urban and edificatory 
logic of the city, affirming their own, autonomous 
order instead. Tafuri draws several consequences 
from this observation, but I would like to focus on 
two particular aspects.
The invention of the entity called “project design” 
is historically credited to Alberti. It is based on the 
total separation between the design stage of the 
project – which is carried out by the architect and 
results in the production of a number of drawings 
that determine the form of buildings – and the 
subsequent stage when the building is constructed 
by a group of people which simply follow the 
instructions contained in the drawings. It was a 
decisive step towards what has been our concept 
of architecture for the past six centuries, and most 
of the time we still design projects according to 
Alberti’s prescription.
However, this is not the invention Tafuri values 
the most when he looks retrospectively to the 
Renaissance “revolution”. More than the procedural 
aspects intrinsic to the project of architecture, 
preceding the object, he is interested in the effect 
produced by objects, by their presence. He is 
particularly interested in the evocation of Classical 
Antiquity brought about by new buildings and in 
confronting that evoked order with the medieval 
urban context. The meaning of buildings – their 
language and their symbolizing capacity – is thus 
fulfilled in the confrontation with their respective 
context. In their dissonance. As Tafuri explains, this 
dissonance can even result in a reversal of roles: 
instead of looking to a Renaissance building as an 
exception in the medieval context, one may see it as 
a presentation (a sort of sample) of a new context in 
light of which the old medieval city is seen from a 
detached outlook.
In order to make these considerations, Tafuri sets 
out from a very particular acceptation of “context”. 
When discussing architectural projects, the term 
“context” usually means the geographic features 
or landscape of a particular location or region, the 
pre-existing “architecture”, the structure of land 
occupation... this acceptation may even be extended 
to include abstract aspects such as the habits and 
the culture of a specific population or specific rules 
which must be followed when intervening in a given 
land parcel. Tafuri refers to context as something 
that determines the interpretation of objects; as a 
set of conceptual assumptions in view of which it 
becomes possible to interpret what the works mean. 
As a cultural a priori that works tend to follow but in 
respect of which certain works (such as Renaissance 
buildings) may acquire a critical dimension. They 
may lead to distancing - the second aspect I would 
like to address.
distancing
For Tafuri, the Renaissance marked the onset 
of a new stage for Architecture as a discipline. It is 
common knowledge that this was the period when 
an architectural language of the past was for the 
first time recovered in a systematic manner, and 
that this recovery reflects a framework of cultural 
and ontological values. Tafuri discusses this fact 
focusing specifically on the concept of “history”. 
From his point of view, Renaissance architects reused 
building forms from the past as a tool to construct a 
discourse. This discourse was not about the past, but 
rather about the relation between the present and 
the past. In other words, forms from the past were 
used not just out of the desire to recover that past, 
but because these forms served as a reference to 
a discourse about the relation between the present 
day and history. For Tafuri, these buildings convey a 
discourse that is, to that extent, historiographical.
Tafuri recognises highly intellectualised intents 
in these projects (much like his own discourse, for 
that matter). Andrew Leach (2007: 97) refers to this 
way of understanding Renaissance architecture, 
stating that ‘(…) in intellectual terms, Architecture 
emerges from this moment as a practice subject to 
its own theoretical programme: it is different from 
building for being what we would now call one of 
the arts’.
Therefore, the establishment of Architecture’s 
“own theoretical programme” was based on projects 
which cited other projects that preceded them. It 
was based on an architecture that represented itself 
–in a self-representation. It is insofar as the projects 
acquire the ability to “speak” for themselves that 
Architecture develops a theoretical corpus.
Tafuri always sees this possibility of self-
representation as the adoption of a retrospective 
stance. He understands the evolution of Architecture 
from the Renaissance period up to the time of his 
writings (the 1960s) as the history of the tension 
between historicism and anti-historicism – in other 
words, as a permanent choice of stance regarding 
the relation between the present and the past.
This also explains the fact that Tafuri refers to 
self-representation as “metalanguage”. If, in order to 
interpret a particular building, it becomes necessary 
to accurately realise which point past it makes 
reference to, then the language of the new building 
must connect with the language of the past it makes 
reference to. The building “speaks about a manner 
of speaking”. That is metalanguage indeed.
I do not think that, in order for Architecture to 
represent itself, it must represent architecture 
produced specifically in the past. A building that 
is not tied to the architecture of the past does not 
necessarily constitute an anti-historicist manifesto, 
as Tafuri assumes. An abstract building may 
represent a “way of understanding buildings”: it may 
represent the universe of buildings, i.e., Architecture 
(in its most traditional acceptation). The Schröder 
House, for example, can be seen as a representation 
of architectural objects in general, understood 
as “sets of coloured plans arranged in space 
conforming spaces”. To this extent, it is actually a 
possible definition for “architecture” (“architecture” 
as in “architectural object”). You could label such 
a project as anti-historicist, or supra-historical, 
but you can also consider it merely abstract – an 
attempt to define the basic constituents of space 
configuration and architectural form.
However, Tafuri’s argument is paramount to 
our understanding of Architecture as a “theoretical 
programme”. The revolution Tafuri identifies in 
Renaissance architecture is in fact the revolution 
he himself introduced in the theory of Architecture: 
despite being bound to history or historiography, Tafuri 
systematizes the concept of self-reflexive project.
A project may represent other projects in order 
to create a discourse about projects.
distancing through stage design
Let’s get back to stage design. After having 
argued that projects which refer to other projects 
(or to project design) possess a self-reflexive nature, 
I would now like to address this issue in the context 
of stage design. I will only consider scenarios 
that represent some part of a supposed reality, 
regardless of their verisimilitude. I will be referring 
to mimetic scenarios, which happen to be the 
most common type, and out of these I will further 
exclude those representing “natural” things, such 
as forests, for example. So let’s focus on scenarios 
representing constructions resulting from human 
design. Considering only this type of scenario, I 
would like to ask: If a scenario is a construction (that 
which is installed on stage) and it refers to other 
constructions (the part of the supposed reality 
evoked on stage), may one assume that all scenarios 
are self-reflexive?
I don’t think so.
For several centuries, stage design has evolved 
to promote illusion, not consciousness. It evolved 
to become verisimilar. The invention of perspective 
in the Renaissance was a key step in this direction. 
The technical resources available to theatres also 
kept evolving until the golden age of mechanical 
devices and grandiose scenarios in the 19th Century, 
which preceded the invention of cinema. Things like 
volcanoes overflowing with lava and ashes falling 
over the actors or entire battles were something one 
could see staged in the great theatres, directed by top 
promoters to impress the wider audiences – to cause 
an impression as strong as the poignant situations 
endured by melodrama characters. Scenarios were 
meant to lend credibility to the narrative and magnify, 
atmospherically, its emotional effect. Their purpose 
was simply to be convincing, not to evoke reflection 
about them or anything else. Like a stimulant, they 
were aimed at emotions.
Already in the 20th Century, Bertolt Brecht would 
openly oppose this model of stage design. In his 
work, as well as set designer Caspar Neher’s, with 
whom he worked, the reference to a “reality” outside 
the stage became critical in nature. Doubly critical, 
in fact:
1. The existence and operation of scenic devices 
were exposed. That which traditionally would 
be hidden was now left in plain sight. The 
recreated fragments of reality were now 
faced as fragments – limited in size in order 
to fit the stage. They no longer occupied the 
entire frame of the “window” through which 
the stage can be seen (breaking the illusion 
that there was a different place beyond the 
window) and, instead, they became scenic 
events that occupied only a part of the stage 
(which was accepted as a stage, i.e. the place 
for a representation). This way, more things 
could be placed on stage. It became possible 
to use elements of different natures which 
could be seen simultaneously, including, 
for example, projections and panels with 
texts. There was also room for some things 
that used to be hidden, such as light sources 
or the musicians. Scenery changes could 
now be seen. Ultimately, theatre itself was 
exposed as a device: the audience was not 
kept in the dark anymore, thus shattering the 
illusion that they were watching something 
which would happen even if the audience 
was not there and emphasizing the fact that 
they were experiencing a communication 
phenomenon. To this extent, Brecht and 
Neher made theatre critical of its own 
devices.
2. Through an inductive process, this theatre 
made apparent that everything mankind 
produces is a construction. Everything is 
the result of a particular choice in a given 
circumstance. Whether on or off the stage, 
facts are not pre-determined but rather 
guided by the will of individuals. That is 
what Brecht sought to prove his audience. 
He believed he could contribute to a process 
of social awareness – namely the promotion 
of class consciousness. Common individuals 
should realise that their place in society was 
determined by the dominant classes, in other 
words, that they were dominated. For this to 
happen, the way of doing of artistic practice 
should evoke, or denounce, the way of doing 
of society in general: it should denounce 
that a production system was at the basis 
of social organisation and that the class 
deemed as “proletarian” had been created 
to feed that system. Speaking to those who 
make theatre, Brecht (1976: 321) advised: ‘Get 
[the audience], friends, to realise that this is 
not magic, but work’.
Therefore, the theatrical experience was 
understood as a cognitive exercise, much more 
reflexive than it used to be. ‘Instead of sharing an 
experience the spectator must come to grasp with 
things’, said Brecht (1964: 23) about his formula of 
“epic theatre”. And to grasp with things means to 
reach the distancing necessary in order to be able 
to see them clearly.
historical distancing
In Brecht’s theatre, this distancing strategy 
includes an additional process known as 
“historicization”. In order to acquire a critical 
perspective regarding the “state of affairs” in the 
present, the present must be contrasted with the 
past – a contrast capable of allowing distancing in 
relation to things that may be too close in time to be 
seen with clarity. Analysing Brecht’s historicization, 
Meg Mumford (2009) identifies seven specific 
operative resources. She calls them “H-effects”: 
(1) distancing from current phenomena by moving 
them to the past; (2) viewing events as the result 
of circumstances and choices with an historical 
specificity; (3) showing the differences between the 
past and the present, highlighting the changes; (4) 
showing the similarities between the past and the 
present, promoting change; (5) denouncing the 
versions of history provided as the vision of the 
ruling class; (6) providing space for suppressed 
and interventionist stories; and (7) presenting all 
versions of history as serving vested interests.
At this point, it probably has become quite clear 
that I am trying to drive the argument towards 
a convergence between the distancing strategy 
proposed by Brecht (1898-1956) and the distancing 
strategy Tafuri (1935-1994) identified in Brunelleschi’s 
buildings. Brecht juxtaposed the past and the 
present within his dramatic narratives, so that both 
would become evident. Tafuri saw the Renaissance 
buildings as a juxtaposition of an object from a time 
to a city from another time, also with the purpose of 
making those times become evident.
Both Tafuri and Brecht believed that the 
confrontation of two different historical times 
could lead to historical consciousness, that is, the 
awareness that the present is the result of what was 
ideologically determined in the past and, above all, 
that what is happening in the present will determine 
the future. This basic realisation makes us agents 
of history just for living in the present. This is what 
allows us to modify history – to choose it, even. Or 
at least to be aware that we could do so.
Tafuri himself – by adopting a transdisciplinary 
perspective – took Brecht as a reference for his 
argument. Tafuri (1988: 113) advocates this promotion 
of consciousness as a possibility for all the different 
arts, stating that ‘Architecture, city and epic theatre, 
they all seek an extreme transparency of the processes 
that led to their making so that they can be revealed 
to those following their stories with distancing’.
In his analysis of Teorie e storia dell’architettura 
(1968), Panayotis Tournikiotis (1999: 214-219) designates 
the possibility formulated by Tafuri – of opening 
Architecture to the questioning of its ideological 
bases – as ‘Brechtian poetics of Architecture’.
After pointing out this convergence between the 
distancing proposed by Brecht and the one Tafuri 
identified, I would now like to consider a few issues 
related to the precise acceptation of said distancing 
according to the individual perspective of each of 
these thinkers, and then draw some conclusions 
about their differences.
distancing from the means of production
What is Tafuri’s acceptation of “processes” 
when he is referring to the phenomena that 
originate the architecture or the city? I have already 
mentioned the ideological function Tafuri assigns 
to the language of buildings. That language may be 
historicist, anti-historicist or – a role of paramount 
importance – the agent of historicization and, to 
that extent, destabiliser of history (Tafuri, 1988)2. 
This destabilisation leads to critical distancing, but 
what is it critical of?
Both Tafuri and Brecht were Marxists. Their political 
worldview is consistent with “historic materialism”: 
the belief that socialisation processes are organised, 
first and foremost, in terms of how people combine 
around a given mode of production. Brecht exposed 
the scenic mechanisms (productive) as a means to 
simultaneously expose historical mechanisms (the 
political narrative whose essence is production). How 
about Tafuri? How does language, a core element in 
Tafuri’s thought, relate to the production issues at 
the core of historical materialism?
From this point of view, it is difficult to relate 
Tafuri’s theory and the immediatism with which 
Brecht addressed the practical aspects of production 
– the ways of doing.
In Teorie e storia dell’architettura (1968), Brecht’s 
name often comes associated to Walter Benjamin, 
who also took Brecht a reference (Benjamin, 1992). 
For Benjamin, the epic theatre is a paradigmatic 
example of art that allows for distancing, precisely 
from the means of production. As seen in Dadaistic 
collages, the use of a given technique in epic theatre 
exposes the existence of that particular technique. 
The way of doing a particular work is not limited to 
a simple means of execution, nor is it a matter of 
virtuosity; it is primarily a part of the work’s theme. 
The work consists, at least in part, in demonstrating 
how it was made. It draws attention to the way it was 
produced like a finger pointing at it.
Tafuri does not take aspects of a productive 
nature into consideration. It is meaningful, for 
example, that Tafuri (1988) refers to Alberti as the 
precursor of the rational exploration of a linguistic 
code rooted in Antiquity and does not mention the 
fact that he also invented the labour concepts of 
“architect” and “project design” as we know them.
And now I can finally return to the starting point: 
perspective. If we momentarily refrain from situating 
facts in their historical context, it is interesting 
to note that Tafuri has elected Brunelleschi as 
the founder of historicization in Architecture – a 
distancing process – when Brunelleschi is also the 
“inventor” of perspective – a feature of illusionism. 
Already in the 20th Century, Brecht (2000) would look 
upon the use of perspectival illusion with disdain, to 
the point of stating that it had no use other than 
providing a comic effect.
device
To conclude, I propose returning to the theme of 
dissonance – that which occurs between the object 
and the context where it is inserted, and which is 
capable of triggering critical distancing. This strategy 
of “anomalous insertion” is historically associated 
to Marcel Duchamp’s readymade. In theatre, it is 
associated to Brecht. Tafuri proposed identifying it 
in Brunelleschi. In as far as regards the latter two 
(both at the core of my argument), an analogy could 
be established between:
• the dissonance between Brunelleschi’s 
Renaissance objects and the medieval city in 
which they were inserted;
• the dissonance between the stage design 
elements used by Brecht and Neher and the 
stage they were inserted in.
This explains why traditional scenarios – 
which occupy the whole stage so as to make it 
appear something it is not – do not have a self-
reflexive scope.
However, there is a fundamental difference 
between Brunelleschi’s objects mentioned by 
Tafuri and the stage design elements used by 
Brecht and Neher.
Scenarios are meant to be observed from the 
outside. Their recipients (the audience) are external 
to them, even though Brecht liked to keep audiences 
illuminated so that they did not forget the situation 
they were in – that they were only watching theatre. 
One could say that in theatres the audience’s eye 
converges towards the stage.
This is not the case with Brunelleschi’s objects. 
They act as the counterpoint to other objects, 
their pre-existing “equals” which, together, make 
up the city. In other words, they are localised 
interpretation keys that permit the understanding 
of a wider context – so wide as to encompass the 
day-to-day experience of the population which is 
their recipient. In a way, the interpretation is made 
from them. The reading is performed starting from 
a centre (the object, in its finitude) to its periphery 
(with its unstable boundaries).
In this sense, the way how Pier Vittorio Aureli 
interprets some of Mies van der Rohe’s buildings 
seems to carry on – and radicalize – Tafuri’s 
understanding of Brunelleschi’s buildings. Regarding 
the plinths Mies created to place its buildings on, 
Aureli (2011: 37) wrote:
This is evident in projects such as Riehl Haus 
(1907), the Barcelona Pavilion (1929), the Seagram 
Building (1954-1958), and the Neue Nationalgalerie 
(1962-1968). By emphasizing the place of the 
building, the plinth inevitably makes that place a 
limit on what it contains. (...) The way the plinth 
organises the relation between the building and its 
place, affects not only the experience one has of 
what is on the plinth, but also – and especially – 
the experience one has of the city, that is outside of 
the plinth. One of the most remarkable things one 
feels when climbing onto a Mies plinth, whether in 
New York or Berlin, is the experience of facing away 
from the building and looking at the city. Suddenly, 
and for a brief moment, one feels detachment 
from the flows and organizational patterns which 
animate the city, even though confronting them.
A device that is formally similar to a stage, but 
works precisely in the opposite way.
Endnotes
1  “Paratactic” is an adjective derived from the noun “parataxis,” 
which designates the juxtaposition of phrases without the use of 
a conjunction between them. In the urban context, Tafuri refers 
to a logical sequence of spaces by simple juxtaposition. Cf. Tafuri 
(1988: 36-38).
2  Tafuri states that “the new functions of art, design, 
architecture, negate the historicity of artistic processes, 
revolutionising its meanings, compromising its values, involving 
them in a dynamic of continuous construction of the world. This 
is what connects the architectural avant-garde to the thinking of 
[Alexander] Dorner, Benjamin, and Brecht: history does not shape 
performance, but rather, it’s the latter that will transform the 
functions of the former”. Cf. Tafuri (1988:76-77).
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